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IN HOC SIGNO VINCES: RELIGIOUS SYMBOLISM
IN THE BALKAN WARS 1991-19951
by Mitja Velikonja
See now, how men lay blame upon us Gods
for what is after all nothing but their own folly.
Homer, The Odyssey, 1st

Book (translated by Samuel Butler)

Dr. Mitja Velikonja is assistant professor in the Faculty of Social Sciences at
the University of Ljubljana in Slovenia, specializing in sociology of religion.
I. DISCOURSE OF IRRATIONALIZATION
Some of the most common explanations for the Balkan wars of the 1990s have been that
they were, in the final analysis, religious wars, or the consequence of national incompatibilities
and cultural differences, or a return of old myths, or a thirst for revenge for historical injustices,
or the logical result of the bloodthirsty ‘national character’ of the Balkan peoples, etc.
Deliberately or not, both local and foreign commentators perceived these developments as being
rationally inexplicable, spontaneous, completely unreasonable, and contrary to any sense of
rationality. In sharp contrast to, for example, the Gulf war, the Balkan wars were comprehended
and portrayed as obscure, dirty, mean, uncivilised, cruel, etc.
Needless to say, every social action--in our case war--has parallel ‘rational’ and
‘irrational’ dimensions, which must be studied carefully. Belligerent groups were very often
from different religious and ideological backgrounds. If we limit ourselves to the secularized
twentieth century, we find mythic constructs, religious rhetoric and archaic iconography at
different times and in different parts of the world. Many nations perceived and may still perceive
themselves to be the Most Ancient, even Holy, Sacred, or Heavenly, as representing Christ
among the nations, as the Elect, or having a God-given mission to fulfil; others are self-declared
warrants of democracy or cultured nations. In history we remember military campaigns called
the Crusades; various dictators were glorified as being sent (or chosen) by God Himself, or as the
incorporation of the Will of the Nation; politicians have often referred to religious traditions and
values and swear before God at their inauguration. The struggle of the proletariat against the
1

This paper was presented at the international conference “Nationality and Citizenship in Post-communist
Europe”, Paris, July 9-10, 2001.

ruling classes was interpreted in terms of a cosmic struggle between Good and Evil; Holy Wars
were fought in different parts of the world by different religious fundamentalists; the cleansing
of their different enemies was imperative for many new states and regimes. The juxtaposition of
“Eternal Allies” versus “Eternal Enemies” could be found by many warring sides, as could the
notion of the Last Bastion of the religion or civilization in question. Borders have been perceived
as sacred, historic, or untouchable; enemies have often been demonized, animalized, or
bestialized, etc.2
It is, of course, not my intention to exonerate any belligerent Southern Slavic
religious nationalists; I disapprove of them as much as I do of any militants or
fundamentalists. I wish to emphasize that the battle cry In hoc signo vinces3 has been heard
across the world throughout the ‘age of the extremes’, to borrow a phrase from Eric
Hobsbawm. In other words, the catastrophic Hobbesian war of all against all.4 is certainly not
some kind of Balkan peculiarity, nor is the significance of the role of religion, its rhetoric and its symbols. Therefore, the same questions
must be asked anytime these phenomena appear anywhere in the world. Other than the hasty and overly simplistic explanations
mentioned above, I view and treat the use--or misuse--of religious iconography, symbols and discourse, and mythological rhetoric in the
recent Balkan wars as a very specific version of and regional manifestation of the broader phenomena of the religionization of politics,5

the nation, place, time, neighbouring groups, and etc.
In my opinion, the ‘irrationalization’ of the Balkan wars in first half of the nineties
(un)intentionally camouflages the main motives and causes which, in chronological order,
are as follows: firstly, the plan to reunite Yugoslavia under the leadership of the nonreformist segments of the League of Communists and Army hard-liners; secondly,
prompted by the ineffective policies of the international community, the great-national
2

For an excellent study of the ethnogenetic myths and rhetoric of the Spanish, French, English, Italians,
Germans and Russians, see Poliakov, 1999; for religious nationalism and religious references in politics in general,
Hastings, 1997; for Russian, German, Nazi-Fascist, Anglo-American national Messianism in general, and French,
Austro-Hungarian, Croatian and Serbian Messianism concerning Bosnia-Herzegovina, see Zgodi , 1999; for an
analysis of the American perception and evaluation of the Vietnam War and the construction of warrior values, see
Resic, 1999; for the relations and rhetoric of the Roman Catholic Church and extreme Right political parties in
Europe before and during WW II. (Italy, France, Slovakia, Croatia, etc.), see Wolff, Hoensch, 1987; for (re)new(ed)
political mythologies in post-socialist societies, see Tismaneanu, 1998.
3
According to legend, a cross and the sign By this sign you will conquer appeared to Roman Emperor
Constantine before the decisive battle at the Milvius bridge near Rome in 312. After the victory, he recognized
Christianity as one of the official religions and erected a monument with the cross as a symbol of his triumph.
4
Bellum omnium in omnes.
5
One of many sociologically significant processes in contemporary societies is the refundamentalization of
established religious communities and their close alliance with (nationalist) politics.

policies and aggressions towards Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. All these goals-reunification and territorial conquests--and the methods in which they were realised, were
undoubtedly strategically well organized, »rational« and pre-planned.6
The obvious attempts to 'irrationalize' recent Balkan history, i.e., to reduce the conflict to a matter of nationalist madness and
religious zeal, to a spontaneous and somewhat naïve barbarity, a revival of age-old hatreds, etc.--combine two particular dimensions.
Firstly, the theoretical: this is the discourse of Orientalism7 and the thesis (one of the most popularized in the 1990s) of unavoidable
cultural conflicts in the contemporary world (in place of the political and ideological conflicts of bygone eras). The second is political: the
deliberate avoidance of responsibility and feigned ignorance by the main culprits responsible for the war.

II. INSTRUMENTALIZED OR INSTRUMENTALIZING?
If we limit ourselves to the religious considerations of the wars, we are faced with a fundamental dilemma. Were religions and
religious communities and symbols used by nationalist politics/policies in their grand nationalist schemes? Or, conversely, did they exploit
nationalist euphoria and policies in achieving their own religious goals? Were they ‘instrumentalized’ or did they ‘instrumentalize?’ In short, did
they play an active or passive role in the most recent Balkan history?
I think the answer is that they did both. My answer to these questions may initially seem paradoxical. To certain religious ‘integrists,’
political developments in the late 1980s and early 1990s presented an excellent opportunity for the long-awaited re-Christianization and reIslamization of the national, political and cultural identity of “their” nations, and the reaffirmation of their dominant position in society.8

The

already belated modernist differentiation and pluralization of these societies seemed to
have been lost to radical pre-modernist de-differentiation.9

Religious institutions rapidly became an

important part of the dominant national/political/religious/cultural meta-platform and strategy.
This total--and totalitarian--alliance between nationalist policies and religious communities and institutions was one of mutual
benefit: national, political and, ultimately, military mobilization could not be achieved without religious legitimation, while, on the other
hand, religious communities were unable to achieve their goals without the active support of nationalist parties and politics in general.
Religious elements became an important part of the process of ‘the ethnification of politics and the politicization of ethnicity’ (as
described by Vrcan, 2001).10
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See for example Špegelj (1994, 2001).
As developed by Said, 1996; for the images of the Balkans, see Todorova, 2001.
8
For a broader review of the characteristics of religious dynamics in post-Socialist countries, see Smrke,
1996, 143-189.
9
This process can righteously be termed “conservative revolution”.
10
For an excellent cultural-anthropological comparative study of the politicization and militarization of folk
heritage, oral tradition and epics, legends, mythic motives, heroic characters and the language itself, see ⎩ani ,
1998.
7

In other words: in this integristic process of religio-national re-traditionalization11,
one needed and strengthened the other: religious institutions lent legitimacy to and opened
perspectives for chauvinist politics, and vice versa. Or, in the words of Radovan Karad〉i ,
not a single important decision was made without the Church (Mojzes, 1998, 89; for a similar
quotation, see Radi , 1998, 176, 177). Likewise, Bosnian ex-Franciscan Provincial Petar
Anπelovi admits that the Church initially supported the major Croatian political party,
but later reversed its policies and became critical of it (Anπelovi , 2000, 207, 208). The
major Muslim/Bosnian party was also influenced by PanIslamic traditionalist groupings
and currents within the Bosnian Islamic religious community (see Bougarel, 1999; L.
Cohen, 1998, 58; Zulfikarpaši , 1995).12
The long Balkan tradition of pluralism dates to the Middle Ages: the Balkans have been a place of meeting, symbiosis, conflict,
collaboration, syncretism, etc., for several religions (and different sects within them): Roman Catholic, Orthodox, Muslim, Bosnian
Christian, Jewish, Uniate (Greek Catholic), and some others. In clear contrast to their self-declared universal character13, religions in
the Balkans (as elsewhere!) feigned specific regional, national, local characteristics: they were/are all ‘ethnicized’ or ‘nationalized’ in a
similar way.14

This becomes particularly obvious in the religio-national mythologies of these

nations. The Christoslavic religio-national mythology--in our case that of the Serbs and
Croats--consists of two basic beliefs: that Slavs are Christian by nature and that any
conversion from Christianity is a betrayal of the Slavic race (Sells 1996, 36, 47, 51). In
short, Christoslavism represents radical Pan-Serbian Orthodox or Pan-Croatian Catholic
mythology,15 whose ultimate goal is a national mono-confessional, (and preferably politically), homogenized state.
But almost identical mytho-logic can be observed also on the third side. According to the advocates of the Bosnian religio-

11

Combined with, on the other side, religio-national exclusivism.
There are opposing views about Alija Izetbegovi ’s maximal ambitions: according to his critic Muhamed
Filipovi (2000, 14, 15), he wanted to return Muslims/Bosniaks to Islam (which was one of the mottos in his
“Islamic Declaration” of 1970, remark by MV) and, after many centuries, to create a Muslim state in Europe. On the
other hand, D〉emaludin Lati , one of the main Bosnian Islamic ideologues, firmly rejects that Izetbegovi had such
plans (Bougarel, 1999, 47).
13
Except, of course, for Judaism.
14
“Tribal” elements appeared within Serbian Orthodoxy as well as within Croatian Catholicism. Banac
describes Bosnian Islam as “folkloric” or “national Islam”, which is in some aspect a substantial negation of
orthodox Islam (Banac, 1994, 5, 6).
15
In short, there can be no Serbianism without Orthodox Christianity (quotation in Radi , 1996, 296); or,
on the Croatian side, religiosity seems to be a matter of genetics: culture and prayer are in our genes, just as faith is
in our genes (Mojzes, 1998, 92).
12

national integrist mythology, all Bosnians are inevitably Muslims.16

One-and-a-half years before the outbreak of

war, Izetbegovi characterized the Muslims/Bosnians as a religious nation (L. Cohen, 1998,
60). Although the role and influence of religious communities and hierarchies before and
during the last wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were quite different, all the
warring parties employed religious symbols in their national/political mobilization and
military efforts. As a rule, dominant religious communities sided with the major political
parties of »their« nations. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the result of such collective politics on a
largely ‘secularized’ population soon became evident.17
Opinions about the nationalist and militaristic role of religious communities in the Balkans from the late 1980s differ
considerably from scholar to scholar. However, the majority claim that the role of the Serbian Orthodox Church was ‘more harmful’
(Mojzes, 1998, 84), than the other two major religious communities. Sells points out that in Bosnia, the Serbian Orthodox Church
became a servant of religious nationalist militancy (Sells, 1996, 79), and. at the beginning, supported Slobodan Miloševi 's politics
(Markotich, 1996, 30).18 According to L. Cohen, the Roman Catholic hierarchy in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina was inclined towards
the largest Croatian political party, which was openly pro-Christian, but also wished to preserve its hard-won autonomy (L. Cohen,
1998, 63). In Bosnia-Herzegovina, there were considerable differences in this regard between the stands of Catholic clergy and the
Franciscans in Herzegovina and in Bosnia. For Bougarel, the role of the Islamic Community in the nationalist mobilization of the
Bosnians was particularly blatant (Bougarel, 1996, 96).

III. RELIGIOUS SYMBOLISM IN THE BALKAN WARS
My paper concentrates only on one aspect of the recent Balkan wars, namely, the use of religious symbolism by the three warring
sides: Orthodox on the Serbian side, Roman Catholic on the Croatian side, and Islamic on the Bosnian side. These examples must be treated and
understood in a broader context of the above-mentioned integrist, religio-national mythologies, Christoslavic or Muslim/Bosnian. A comparative

16

For Reis-ul-Ulema Mustafa Ceri , without Islam, Islamic civilization and Islamic culture, we are
nothing. For him, the Bosniak national identity, language and the army can focus around Islam (Bougarel, 2000, 92,
93). Some Bosniak authors persistently repeat the historiographical myth that Bosnian Muslims are the descendants
of the medieval adherents of the Bosnian Church (wrongly named bogomili), who converted to Islam en masse after
the Ottoman conquest and, for this reason, are the only indigenous nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina (in contrast to the
“latecomers” Serbs and Croats). See, for example, M. Hand〉i , 1940, and A. Hand〉i , 1994 (and to some degree
also Had〉ijahi , 1990 and Had〉ijahi , Tralji , Šukri , 1991).
17
Public opinion polls in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1988 showed that only 55.8 % of the Croats, 37.3 % of the
Muslims/Bosniaks, 18.6 % of the Serbs and 2.3 % of the Yugoslavs declared themselves as believers (Baki , 1994,
72). The situation completely changed a decade later: 89.5 % of the Croats and 78.3 % of the Bosniaks in the
Bosnian Federation declared themselves as “religious persons” (Vrcan, 2001, 167); research in Doboj region in 2000
showed that 88 % of the Croats, 84.8 % of the Bosniaks, 81.6 % of the Serbs and 16.7 % of those nationally
undefined declared themselves as “very religious” and “medium religious” (Krajina, 2001, 248).
18
After its break with Miloševi , the Serbian Orthodox Church remained loyal to Greater Serbian politics
and ambitions and sided with the régimes in Pale and Knin.

and socio-historical analytical approach can, to some degree, elucidate how traditional religious symbols were renewed and how new religious
symbols were ‘traditionalized’ during that period; how they were ‘nationalized’ and ‘politicized;’ what elements of religious heritage were most
often applied; and how these symbols were exploited for military operations and the politics of ethnic/religious cleansing. Due to restrictions on
space, I shall only present a foundation for further, more profound analyses.19

1. Use of Traditional Religious Symbols.
Universal religious symbols (the cross for the Orthodox and Catholic; the Crescent, the colour green, and Qur’anic inscriptions for
Boshniaks), or religious symbols that had already been ‘nationalized’ (e.g., the Serbian Orthodox symbol /four S’s surrounding a cross/, or the
combination of the cross and the Croatian coat-of-arms /the so-called chessboard/

), were used regularly by the warring

sides, either individually or as part of broader political or military symbolism. They were
worn on uniforms, as personal military decor (e.g., badges bearing religious symbols, green
bands tied around the forehead with(out) Qur’anic inscriptions, rosaries), and on military
equipment and weapons, flags etc. Uniforms and appearance were sometimes inspired by
religious or religio-national tradition, e.g., beards and Islamic outfits on the Bosnian side,
and Chetnik-like attire on the Serbian side. Some Bosnian military units assumed names
that were inspired by their religion, and in which rigorous religious customs were practised
(e.g., the Green Berets, El Mujahidin, the Green Legion, Muslim Brigades). Among their
number were volunteers from various Islamic states.

2. Use of Traditional Religious Slogans and Salutations.
Some of the most common traditional religious slogans and synthagmas used in military
and nationalist rhetoric over the last ten years have been God and the Croats; God protects the
Serbs; A Serb is protected by St. Sava and God; God is most Great,21 etc. Salutations included
So help you God, Heroes! , the three-finger Serbian Orthodox salute, benediction under the
sign of the cross, the use of the expressions brothers and sisters, and many more. Army
chaplains--Christian and Muslim--were to be found in almost every military unit; religious
19

Anyhow, the parallel approach does not mean that I want to equalize the influence and responsibilities of
the three sides for the warfare, which is clearly very different.
20
Šahovnica.
21
Bog i Hrvati; Bog uva Srbe; Srbina uva Sava i Bog; Allahu Akbar (in Arabic).
22
Pomoz' Bog, junaci!

practices, customs and symbols were introduced to military life, barracks and units.
Religious services and rituals, including the blessing of units and weapons, were often
conducted by local religious dignitaries. Senior clergymen, such as bishops, conducted the
most important services and rituals. They regularly visited their troops in the liberated
territories.23 On such occasions, the images of (erstwhile) political leaders and military commanders were displayed alongside icons,
images of important religious personalities and symbols.
The sites of dramatic historical and religious events became the destinations and sites of religio-national pilgrimages and
rituals (Medjugorje for the Croats, Ajvatovica24 for the Bosnians, the tombs of second-world-war Ustasha victims for the Serbs);
religious feasts were turned into national holidays (Easter, Assumption, Christmas, St. Vitus’ Day, the Bajram, commemoration of the
battle of Badr, and the night of the Might

) and were celebrated in public buildings. Marching songs and

political hymns declared religio-national unity and unanimity.26
On the eve of war, the skeletal remains of fallen and tortured compatriots from
World War II were exhumed and ritually reburied; the ceremonial procession carrying the
remains of Prince Lazar through Serbia proper, Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1988
was of a similar nature. A number of high-ranking religious dignitaries, victims of the
second world war or post-war violence, who were tortured and killed for religious and
national causes, were canonized. Examples are Orthodox Metropolite Dositelj Vasi and
bishops Petar Zimonji , Sava Trljaji and Platon Jovanovi in June 1998, and Catholic
Cardinal Alojzije Stepinac in October of the same year. In some of the more militant
Croatian Roman Catholic circles, similar homage was conferred on a number of important
personalities from the wartime Ustasha regime,

and on the Serbian side, to Chetnik

commanders.
Contemporary political and military leaders received a flattering religious

23

For example, Patriarch Pavle visited Pale, Knin and the troops besieging Gora〉de.
Known also as Bosnian Mecca, small hajji or hajji for the impoverished (see Lovrenovi , 2000, 55, 56)
25
Laiat at-kadr, the night when the Qur’an was revealed to Mohammed.
26
Here are some examples: The Serbian army are we, All believers in God (Srpska vojska to smo mi, svi u
Boga vernici) ( olovi , 1994, 123); or May our unified voice be heard, There is one God for us all, A Croatian
battle is being waged, Attention, all you criminals (Nek se ori slo〉an glas, Bog je jedan za sve nas, hrvatski se boje
boj, zlo incima stoj (Anti , 1996, 36); or The Green Flag is fluttering, long live SDA, Herceg-Bosna is joyful, our
leader is Alija (Zeleni se barjak vije, nek nam 〉ivi SDA /Stranka demokratske akcije, Party of the Democratic Action,
the main Bosniak party, led by Izetbegovi , remark by MV), veseli se Herceg-Bosna, voπa nam je Alija ( ani ,
1998, 255).
27
For examples, see Velikonja, 1998, 328.
24

reputation as well: Karad〉i and Ratko Mladi were said to be following the thorny path of
Christ. The first received a decoration from the Greek Orthodox Church, which declared
him one of the most prominent sons of our Lord Jesus Christ working for peace (Sells, 1996,
85).

Similar courtesies, exaltation and consecration were afforded by high-ranking

Orthodox dignitaries to another controversial protagonist of the Balkan wars-- eljko
Ra〉natovi Arkan. For some Islamic believers, Izetbegovi became a fighter for Islam, sent
by God to lead the Muslims along the true path (Zulfikarpaši , 1995, 144, 172), the first
person after Muhammad to reveal and fulfil the ultimate truth (Miroslav Jan i

in

Mojzes, 1998, 94). Saudi King Fahd awarded Izetbegovi with a medal for his contribution
to the spread of Islam.

3. Interpretation of Political Developments in Religious Terms.
As Hastings points out (1997, 18), “the Bible, moreover, presented in Israel itself a
developed model of what it means to be a nation--a unity of people, language, religion, territory
and government.”

In the Balkans, historical and contemporary developments were

interpreted in religious terms: analogies were made between contemporaries and episodes
and personalities from the Scriptures or the religious history of their own nation. In some
Orthodox circles, for example, the Serbs were referred to as Christ's Nation, the Holy or
Suffering Nation, the Bearers of the Truth and Divine Justice, the avant-garde of the Slav
world and Orthodoxy. Serbia was again referred to as Heavenly, etc. Similar constructs
were also to be found on the Croatian side (Eternal or Holy Croatia; protected by the Virgin
Mary). The triumphant Croatian military operation “Storm” in August 1995 was seen as
testimony that this nation (Croatia, remark by MV) is at certain times touched by God
(Vrcan, 2001, footnote 11 on page 207).31
In both cases, tragic episodes from the past and present of both nations have been
28

He described himself as the defender of our tribe and our Church (Mojzes, 1998, 89).
And continues: “Perhaps it was an almost terrifyingly monolithic ideal, productive ever after all sorts of
dangerous fantasies, but it was there, an all to obvious exemplar for Bible readers of what every other nation too
might be, a mirror for national self-imagining” (Hastings, 1997, 18).
30
Even God himself is Serb, according to turbo-folk singer Baja-Mali Knind〉a (the verse Bog je Srbin, ne
boji se Srbine/Bog je Srb, ne boji se Srb on MC “Pobedi e istina”, 1994) (Duijzings, 1999).
31
An example of Croatian Catholic exclusivism - Someone said that Europe is ill. That’s right. Europe is ill
in its wealth. The Croatian nation has preserved its morality and its Christianity. – is quoted by Buden (2000, 59).
29

variously interpreted as Golgotha, the Crucifixion, Calvary or the Way of the Cross, their
land has been declared Sacred, as our Jerusalem or our Palestine, etc. The self-victimizing
discourse, such as “only our nation/religion suffers,” exculpated political action and
military operations. In Karad〉i 's words, our deaths, suffering and endurance, we accept as
God's grace (Powers, 1998, 236). Bosnian Muslims were said to be making sacrifices to
safeguard Islam by identifying its enemies (Zulfikarpaši , 1995, 172).
As a rule, political decisions and military operations received religious
argumentation and legitimations, and were openly supported by some religious media
and in public statements made by religious dignitaries. Thus, they were exalted as actions.
Examples are, in the name of God, Manifestations of the Faith, Struggle for Christ and
Europe, Sacred Duty, self-defence, war of liberation, fight for the Holy Cross, etc. Fallen
soldiers became martyrs34 or Knights of the Faith (and the Nation) who made voluntary
sacrifices for their religion and nation in the struggle against the infidels. Their tombs and
monuments were designed as religious objects (in form and with religious inscriptions and
symbols, etc.). All sides searched for the help of their co-religionists, who suddenly became
Ancient if not Eternal Allies. There were initiatives to create a so-called Orthodox Circle (an
association of all countries with an Orthodox majority), or a narrower Balkan Orthodox
Union.35 The Bosnians ‘discovered’ a long-lasting friendship with Muslim (Arabic)
countries, while the Croats found the same in Western (Catholic) countries and the
Vatican.

4. Demonization of the Enemy.
In religio-national policies and military operations, the first step towards the destruction
of the enemy is the process of their symbolic dehumanization. In the racial discourse, they
become inferior, animal-like creatures. In the religio-national discourse, they are cursed by God.
This dehumanizaton and demonization of adversaries was engaged in by all three sides. As
though entrapped in some kind of laboratory of hatred, the enemy was condemned as genocidal,
diabolical, etc. Myths about religious conspiracies emerged. For Serbian religious nationalists,
32

For examples, see Jokanovi , 1999 (especially the Introduction).
For the role of the Serbian Orthodox media, see Radi , 1998, 84-86.
34
Mu enici or – on the Bosniak side - šehidi.
35
However, the Serbian Orthodox Church hierarchy did not support these initiatives.
33

these were about the Vatican (and German) plot, and the Pope's servants (Italy, Austria and
Germany); the conspiracy of Western Powers;36 the Green Transversal (Ankara-TiranaSarajevo) and the conspiracies by Islamic fundamentalists (and Ustasha butchers).
If we limit ourselves only to insults related to religious identities, the Serbian
extremists (and the Croatian during Croatian-Bosnian clashes) labelled the Bosnians as
jihad fighters, mujahidins, janissaries, brothers in fez, whose final ambition was to turn
Bosnia into a state modelled on the Qur'an, an Islamic fundamentalist state, or a Libyanstyle Jamahiriyah in which non-Muslims would become slaves, etc.37 In the chauvinistic
media, Izetbegovi

became the world’s foremost soldier of the jihad or the leader of the

Muslim terrorists. Croat religious nationalists feared Orthodox conspiracies or alleged plans
to create an Islamic state38 in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Alarmist discourses also appeared in
some Bosnian circles, which identified evil-minded plots, the Crusades launched by both
enemies’ sides and by a Christian Europe. Thus, religio-nationalist extremists from all
sides justified their policies not only as a defence of their own nation, but also as shields,
last bastions or fortresses of, respectively, the Orthodox, Catholic and Muslim world.41 An
obsessive paranoia of being surrounded by enemies of the faith triumphed. As Hobsbawm wrote, “there is no more effective way of
bonding together the disparate sections of restless peoples than to unite them against outsiders” (Hobsbawm, 1995, 91).
If our faith is the only right and righteous42

36

one, then that of the enemy (or of religious minorities

In March 1993, at a funeral for Serbian victims, the local Orthodox bishop stated that not the standards of
God, but those of the Devil – those are the criteria which today’s world public is applying in its attitude toward the
Serbs who follow the Orthodox faith (Maleši , 1998, 68).
37
There were even constructs that Muslims were plotting to put Serbian women in harems (Sells, 1996, 23)
or that they were planning to turn Fo a into a new Mecca (Malcolm, 1996, 237). For the role of Serbian orientalists
in invigorating anti-Muslim feelings, see Norris, 1993, 295-297 and Cigar, 2000; for the role of some circles of
Serbian intelligentsia, see Maleši , 1998, 71.
38
See examples in Mojzes, 1998, 91; Powers, 1998, 222.
39
In 1992, a handbill signed by anonymous Muslim Brothers and addressed to the Children of Allah
explains that our fatherland Bosnia-Herzegovina is attacked and enslaved by pagans. Chetniks slaughter us, while
Latins (traditional name for Catholics, remark by MV) deceive us, they are taking and abducting our land (D〉aja,
1994, 34).
40
Lati stated that brutal European encirclement would destroy such a state (Islamic, remark by MV) with
the atomic bomb if necessary (Bougarel, 1999, 47).
41
Paradoxically, the enemies were, on the other hand, sometimes perceived essentially as compatriots but
of the enemy faith: according to some mythmakers, Bosniaks were in fact Islamized Serbs or Croats of the Muslim
faith while some of the Bosnian Croats were allegedly Catholicized Serbs.
42
According to research conducted in the Bosnian Federation 1999, 53.7 % of the Bosniaks and 41.2 % of
the Croats think that Islam/Christianity is the sole true religion (Vrcan, 2001, 175). Unfortunately, there are no data
for the Serbian Republic.

within their own nations) is scorned as being false, foreign, heretical, superstitious, and even
sacrilegious. According to this logic of symbolic diatribes, the elimination of other faiths-religious and ethnic cleansing--becomes a religious duty. Killing is no longer considered as
“homicide,” but as a “malicide,” the liquidation of the evil. Many clerics were killed or
injured during these clashes and ethnic cleansing campaigns. However, militant religious
nationalists also demonized political adversaries and critics within a nation. For example,
after abandoning his Greater Serbian policy, Miloševi was characterized as the Antichrist
from Dedinje, his ideology as sombre and his régime as alien to Orthodox tradition and the
essence of the Serbian nation (whereas those in Knin and Pale were deemed to be
exemplary). According to PanIslamist Lati , secularized Bosnian intellectuals are more
dangerous to us than the Chetniks (Bougarel, 2000, 90).
Non-integrist ideas, political parties and individuals were also many times
condemned by religious nationalists on all three sides as atheistic, nihilistic, anti-national,
foreign, modernist, pro-Western, liberal, left-wing, etc. Similarly, the Socialist régime was
perceived as being (in) directly responsible for the outbreak of hatred and violence because
of its desertion of the Bible/Qur’an and because of its immorality and Godless, soulless,
secularist and anti-Serb/Croat/Muslim orientation. The false and dangerous logic that there
exists only one type of conflict, namely, between faith and nihilism, and that ExtraEcclesiam nulla salus, reappeared.

5. Destruction of the Enemy’s Sacred Objects.
In militarist logic, victory is complete when it is accompanied with the symbolic triumph
over the enemy. The buildings that were most often systematically destroyed throughout the wars
in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina--either in military operations or following conquest--were
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For example, emigrant priest and self-declared Chetnik vojvoda Mom ilo Djuji ’s promised that he will
return to Serbia when Vojislav Šešelj and his paramilitary units succeed in cleansing Serbia of the last Jew,
Albanian, and Croat (P. J. Cohen, 1997, 10); Mirko Jovi , one of the Serbian paramilitary leaders, demanded
Christian, Orthodox Serbia with no Muslims and no unbelievers (Sells, 1996, 80). According to retired Croatian
Catholic priest Ante Bakovi , these weeds must be uprooted from the new Croatia (Mihaljevi , 1994). Or, we must
change people, say in the organization “Active Islamic Youth” (AIO) (Karup, 1998). Sometimes it seems that the
tragic war was just the first step towards the complete annihilation of pluralism between and within these national
communities.
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As Anπelovi points out, by driving God out of schools, universities, family homes and, finally, out of
human souls, Communists made room for Evil (Anπelovi , 2000, 176).

religious: mosques, churches, chapels, monasteries etc. According to some estimates, 1,000 to
1,100 mosques were demolished, along with approximately 340 Orthodox and 450 Roman
Catholic churches and monasteries (Powers, 1998, footnote 68 on page 240; Velikonja, 1998,
309).45 As has been the case throughout history, the religious symbols of the conquerors were built on the ruins of the sanctuaries of
the vanquished. Territory must be symbolically appropriated and the sign of victory engraved in stone. For example, Croatian forces
erected a huge concrete cross in place of a destroyed mosque in Po itelj (Vrcan, 2001, 22).
First to raze, first to erect. It is also very symptomatic that sacred buildings were among the first objects to be restored or
rebuilt after the war. Reconstruction was often sponsored by foreign countries or their religious communities (Greek Orthodox Church,
Islamic Community, often from Saudi Arabia, Roman Catholic Church etc.). The first synagogue to be built in Bosnia-Herzegovina after
1945 is expected to be completed in Mostar by the end of 2002; the foundation stone was laid in early May 2001. Such reconstruction is
practically impossible on territory conquered by the adversary. On May 5 in Trebinje and May 7 (2001) in Banja Luka, Serbian
extremists held violent protests against the ceremonies dedicating the new foundations for new mosques intended to replace the
destroyed ones. These events are sad and not uncommon examples.46 These (and other less obvious) examples clearly demonstrate that
in post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina (here I replace Clausewitz), peace is just the continuation of the war ‘with other means.’
6. Eloquent Silence
In such situations, that which is not uttered is as important as that which is. Silence can be more eloquent than words. Not only
explicit, but also another indirect symbolic act of religious institutions must be pointed out here: namely, the sinister silence regarding the
obvious and systematic persecution and liquidation of believers of other faiths, and the destruction of their (religious) infrastructure. In other
words, significant was not only hate-speech but also hate-silence. Only rarely have moderate representatives of the religious hierarchies reacted
and condemned the acts committed by their compatriots/co-religionists. What usually happens is that they distance themselves from the blatant
manipulation of religious justification, rhetoric and symbols, and explicitly reject religious nationalists of their own faith/nation.

IV. UNSUITABILITY OF APRIORISM
Religions, their traditional symbols and rhetoric remain important and extremely persuasive elements of contemporary national and
political mythologies and their iconography. Although latently present at all times, they are particularly exposed during the critical periods in a
nation's history. As such, they must not be treated as something that is neither a priori tolerant nor militant, nor conciliatory or destructive, nor
oriented or toward friendship or enmity, or zealot well intentioned. In short, they are neither hateful nor peaceful in advance. Their current
interpretations and practical activities make them become such. The cross and the crescent are easily transformed into the sword, and the
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The Franciscan order in Bosnia-Herzegovina alone suffered the destruction of four monasteries, twenty
presbyteries and twenty-five parish churches and a number of smaller ones (Anπelovi , 2000, 162, 163, 167).
46
In the summer of 1998, “religious” passion was aroused by a proposal to build a mosque at Zamet near
Rijeka. According to its opponents, minarets would announce that Europe had been uprooted from this region.

brilliance of faith, as understood by believers, turn into the glare of the blade. The step from mythomaniac theory to bloodthirsty terror is a small
one; any creed can be transformed into a ruthless beast.
This short introductory presentation illustrates how nationalized, politicized and militarized religious symbolism (and religious
communities in general) are not merely the consequence of recent catastrophic events in the Balkans, but also one of the sources--not only the
conclusion but also one of the origins. The hidden hypothesis of this outstanding attention to the religious dimensions and iconography of Balkan
warfare as promoted by local religious nationalists and some foreign or local simplistic or malevolent interpreters, is that the problems between
these nations are irrational and cannot be solved in a rational way. In such a narrow-minded or malicious and destructive discourse, the
differences between Serbs, Croats, Bosnians and other nations--Orthodox, Catholics, Muslims, Jews, other believers and atheists--seem too large
to be bridged and, as such, becomes the predominant source of the recent hatred and warfare and an instant explanation for it.
Such inciting and irrationalizing discourse can be successfully rejected, firstly, by carefully studying the whole complexity of the
causes of the tragedies, i.e. the parallelism between the well planned, ‘rational’ causes (i.e. Realpolitik) and the ‘irrational,’ mythical and
symbolic causes. Secondly, it may be rejected through a profound analysis of this particular aspect, namely, the statements, behavior and actions
of religious institutions, the clergy and, indeed, the believers themselves. And thirdly, it may be rejected by recollecting the rich multinational,
multireligious and multicultural tradition of the Balkans. Only after doing this may all the involved parties and institutions, including the
religious, reflect on their attitudes and activities during this period.47
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